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Abstract The paper deals with a zero-sum differential game in which the
dynamical system is described by a fractional differential equation with the
Caputo derivative of an order α ∈ (0, 1). The goal of the first (second) player
is to minimize (maximize) the value of a given quality index. The main contri-
bution of the paper is the proof of the fact that this differential game has the
value, i.e., the lower and upper game values coincide. The proof is based on
the appropriate approximation of the game by a zero-sum differential game in
which the dynamical system is described by a first order functional differential
equation of a retarded type. It is shown that the values of the approximating
differential games have a limit, and this limit is the value of the original game.
Moreover, the optimal players’ feedback control procedures are proposed that
use the optimally controlled approximating system as a guide.
Keywords Differential game · Value of the game · Optimal strategies ·
Fractional derivative · Fractional differential equation · Approximation ·
Control with a guide
1 Introduction
The paper is devoted to the development of the theory of zero-sum differential
games (see, e.g., [3,4,6,9,10,18,25,28,40] and the references therein) to the
case when a motion of a dynamical system is described a fractional differential
equation. For the basics of fractional calculus, theory of fractional differential
equations and their applications, the reader is referred to [8,20,35,39,41].
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Despite the fact that a great number of various control problems in frac-
tional order systems are intensively studied nowadays, only a few works deal
with differential games in such systems (see [1,7,34,38] and the references
therein). Furthermore, in these works, only some special classes of linear
pursuit-evasion differential games are investigated.
In the paper, we follow the game-theoretical approach [22,23,25,28,37,43,
44] and consider a quite general formulation of a zero-sum differential game in
a fractional order system. We suppose that a motion of the system is described
by a non-linear fractional differential equation with the Caputo derivative of
an order α ∈ (0, 1). The game is considered on a finite time interval. The
goal of the first (second) player is to minimize (maximize) the value of a given
quality index evaluating the system’s motion. The main contribution of the
paper is the proof of the fact that the considered differential game has the
value, i.e., the lower and upper values of the game coincide.
Due to non-local structure of fractional order derivatives, fractional differ-
ential equations are used for describing dynamical systems with the memory
effects of a special kind. It makes these equations close to functional differential
equations (see, e.g., [5,16,21]). In particular, the Riemann-Liouville fractional
integral of the order (1−α) of the solution to the considered fractional differen-
tial equation is, by the definition, the solution to the corresponding first order
functional differential equation of a neutral type. It allows us to introduce a
differential game in this neutral type system and study it instead of the origi-
nal game. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no results that can
be applied for investigating the obtained differential game. Namely, in [2,14,
15,29,30,33,36], only some special classes of neutral type systems are consid-
ered, and, in [45], the game is considered in the classes of players’ programm
(open-loop) strategies.
Nevertheless, following [12], based on the finite-difference Gru¨nwald-Let-
nikov formulas for calculation of fractional derivatives (see, e.g., [41, p. 386]),
one can approximate the obtained differential game in the first order neutral
type system by a differential game in a first order retarded type system. Let
us note that differential games in dynamical systems described by functional
differential equations of a retarded type are quite well studied (see, e.g., [25,
28,37] and the references therein), especially in comparison with differential
games in neutral type systems. Thus, applying the results of [26,27,28], we
derive that the approximating differential game has the value, and, moreover,
this value is achieved in the appropriate classes of players’ positional (closed-
loop) strategies.
Further, based on the ideas from [24] (see also [30]), to establish a connec-
tion between the original and approximating differential games, we consider
the players’ feedback control procedures that use the optimally controlled ap-
proximating system as a guide (see, e.g., [25, § 8.2]). It allows us to prove that
the values of the approximating games have a limit, and this limit coincides
with the value of the original game. The key point here is the mutual aiming
procedure between the original and approximating systems [12] that provides
the desired proximity between the systems’ motions. Moreover, in particular,
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we obtain that the proposed players’ control procedures with a guide guaran-
tee the game value with a given accuracy, and, in this sense, they can be called
optimal.
Let us note also that differential games give a natural formalization of
control problems under conditions of unknown disturbances (see, e.g., [22,23,
25,44]). In some other frameworks, such control problems in fractional order
systems are studied, e.g., in [19,42].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the
notations, recall the definitions of fractional order integrals and derivatives,
and give some of their properties. In Sect. 3, the considered differential game in
a fractional order system is described, and, in particular, the notion of the game
value is defined. The corresponding differential game in a first order neutral
type system is discussed in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we propose an approximation
of this game by a differential game in a first order retarded type system. In
Sect. 6, the mutual aiming procedure between the original and approximating
systems and the optimal players’ control procedures with a guide are described,
the limit of the values of the approximating differential game is introduced. In
Sect. 7, we prove that the original differential game has the value. Concluding
remarks are given in Sect. 8.
2 Notations and Definitions
Let t0, ϑ ∈ R, t0 < ϑ, and n ∈ N be fixed. Let R
n be the n-dimensional Euclid-
ian space with the scalar product 〈·, ·〉 and the norm ‖ · ‖. By L∞([t0, ϑ],R
n),
we denote the space of essentially bounded (Lebesgue) measurable functions
x : [t0, ϑ]→ R
n with the norm
‖x(·)‖∞ = ess sup
t∈[t0,ϑ]
‖x(t)‖.
Let C([t0, ϑ],R
n) be the space of continuous functions x : [t0, ϑ] → R
n with
the uniform norm, which is also denoted by ‖ · ‖∞. Let Lip
0([t0, ϑ],R
n) be the
set of functions x(·) ∈ C([t0, ϑ],R
n) that are Lipschitz continuous and satisfy
the equality x(t0) = 0. For L ≥ 0, we denote by Lip
0
L([t0, ϑ],R
n) the set of
functions x(·) ∈ Lip0([t0, ϑ],R
n) that satisfy the Lipschitz condition with this
constant L.
Let α ∈ (0, 1) be fixed. For a function x : [t0, ϑ] → R
n, the Riemann-
Liouville (R.-L.) fractional integral of the order α and the R.-L. fractional
derivative of the order α are respectively defined by
(Iαx)(t) =
1
Γ (α)
∫ t
t0
x(τ)
(t− τ)1−α
dτ,
(Dαx)(t) =
d
dt
(I1−αx)(t) =
1
Γ (1− α)
d
dt
∫ t
t0
x(τ)
(t− τ)α
dτ, t ∈ [t0, ϑ],
(1)
where Γ is the gamma function. For the properties of the fractional order inte-
grals and derivatives, the reader is referred to [8,20,35,39,41]. In this section,
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we shortly describe those properties that are used in the paper. The details
can also be found in [11,12].
Let Iα(L∞([t0, ϑ],R
n)) be the set of functions x : [t0, ϑ] → R
n that can
be represented by the R.-L. fractional integral of the order α of a function
ϕ(·) ∈ L∞([t0, ϑ],R
n), i.e., x(t) = (Iαϕ)(t), t ∈ [t0, ϑ].
Let x(·) ∈ Iα(L∞([t0, ϑ],R
n)). Then the derivative (Dαx)(t) exists for
almost every t ∈ [t0, ϑ]; the inclusion (D
αx)(·) ∈ L∞([t0, ϑ],R
n) is valid; and
x(t) = (Iα(Dαx))(t), t ∈ [t0, ϑ]. Moreover, there exists H > 0 such that, for
any x(·) ∈ Iα(L∞([t0, ϑ],R
n)), the following inequality holds:
‖x(t)− x(t′)‖ ≤ H‖(Dαx)(·)‖∞|t− t
′|α, t, t′ ∈ [t0, ϑ]. (2)
Further, let us consider the function y(t) = (I1−αx)(t), t ∈ [t0, ϑ]. Then,
according to (1), we have y˙(t) = (Dαx)(t) for almost every t ∈ [t0, ϑ], where we
denote y˙(t) = dy(t)/dt; the inclusion y(·) ∈ Lip0L([t0, ϑ],R
n) is valid with the
constant L = ‖(Dαx)(·)‖∞; and the following representation formula holds:
x(t) = (D1−αy)(t) =
1
Γ (α)
∫ t
t0
y˙(τ)
(t− τ)1−α
dτ, t ∈ [t0, ϑ]. (3)
Finally, for a function x : [t0, ϑ]→ R
n, the Caputo (C.) fractional derivative
of the order α is defined by
(CDαx)(t) =
(
Dα(x(·)− x(t0))
)
(t), t ∈ [t0, ϑ]. (4)
In particular, if x(t0) = 0, then the R.-L. and C. fractional derivatives coincide.
3 Differential Game with Fractional Dynamics
3.1 Fractional Order System
We consider a dynamical system which motion is described by the following
fractional differential equation with the C. derivative of the order α :
(CDαx)(t) = f(t, x(t), u(t), v(t)), t ∈ [t0, ϑ],
x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ U, v(t) ∈ V.
(5)
Here t is the time; x(t) is the value of the state vector at the time t; u(t) and
v(t) are respectively the values of the control vectors of the first and second
players at the time t; t0 and ϑ are called the initial and terminal times; the
sets U ⊂ Rr and V ⊂ Rs are compact, r, s ∈ N. We suppose that the function
f : [t0, ϑ]× R
n × U× V→ Rn satisfies the following conditions:
(A.1) The function f is continuous.
(A.2) For any R ≥ 0, there exists λ > 0 such that
‖f(t, x, u, v)− f(t, x′, u, v)‖ ≤ λ‖x− x′‖
for any t ∈ [t0, ϑ], x, x
′ ∈ B(R) = {y ∈ Rn : ‖y‖ ≤ R}, u ∈ U, and v ∈ V.
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(A.3) There exists c > 0 such that
‖f(t, x, u, v)‖ ≤ (1 + ‖x‖)c
for any t ∈ [t0, ϑ], x ∈ R
n, u ∈ U, and v ∈ V.
(A.4) The saddle point condition in a small game [25, p. 8] or, in another
terminology, the Isaacs’ condition [18, p. 35], holds, i.e.,
min
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉 = max
v∈V
min
u∈U
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉
for any t ∈ [t0, ϑ] and x, s ∈ R
n.
Note that these conditions are quite typical for the differential games theory
with first order dynamics (see, e.g., [25, p. 7]).
3.2 Admissible Positions of the System
By a position of system (5), we mean a pair (t, w(·)) consisting of a time
t ∈ [t0, ϑ] and a function w(·) ∈ C([t0, t],R
n), which is treated as a motion
history on the interval [t0, t]. The set of the positions (t, w(·)) is denoted by
G. A position (t, w(·)) ∈ G is called admissible if the relations below are valid:
w(t0) ∈ B(R0),
w(·) ∈ {w(t0)} + I
α(L∞([t0, t],R
n)),
‖(CDαw)(τ)‖ ≤ (1 + ‖w(τ)‖)c for a.e. τ ∈ [t0, t],
(6)
where R0 > 0 is a fixed constant, c is the constant from condition (A.3).
According to the definition given in Sect. 2, the second inclusion in (6) means
that there exists a function ϕ(·) ∈ L∞([t0, t],R
n) such that w(τ) = w(t0) +
(Iαϕ)(τ), τ ∈ [t0, t]. The set of the admissible positions is denoted by G∗.
Proposition 1 The set G∗ is not empty, and there exist R1 > 0, M1 > 0,
and H1 > 0 such that, for any (t, w(·)) ∈ G∗, the inequalities below are valid:
‖w(τ)‖ ≤ R1, τ ∈ [t0, t],
‖(CDαw)(τ)‖ ≤M1 for a.e. τ ∈ [t0, t],
‖w(τ) − w(τ ′)‖ ≤ H1|τ − τ
′|α, τ, τ ′ ∈ [t0, t].
Proof Let t ∈ [t0, ϑ] and w0 ∈ B(R0). Let us consider the function w(τ) = w0,
τ ∈ [t0, t]. According to (1) and (4), we have (
CDαw)(τ) = 0, τ ∈ [t0, t]. Hence,
the inclusion (t, w(·)) ∈ G∗ is valid, and, therefore, the set G∗ is not empty.
Further, let us define
R1 = (1 +R0)Eα((ϑ− t0)
αc)− 1, M1 = (1 +R1)c, H1 = HM1,
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where c is the constant from (A.3), Eα is the Mittag-Leffler function (see, e.g.,
[41, (1.90)]), and H is the constant from (2). Let (t, w(·)) ∈ G∗. Then, due to
(6) and the results given in Sect. 2, we have
‖w(τ) − w(t0)‖ =
∥∥∥∥ 1Γ (α)
∫ τ
t0
(CDαw)(ξ)
(τ − ξ)1−α
dξ
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1Γ (α)
∫ τ
t0
(1 + ‖w(ξ)‖)c
(τ − ξ)1−α
dξ
for any τ ∈ [t0, t], and, therefore,
‖w(τ)‖ ≤ R0 +
c
Γ (α)
∫ τ
t0
1 + ‖w(ξ)‖
(τ − ξ)1−α
dξ, τ ∈ [t0, t].
From this inequality, applying the fractional version of Bellman-Gronwall lemma
(see, e.g., [8, Lemma 6.19] and also [11, Lemma 1.1]), we conclude ‖w(τ)‖ ≤
R1, τ ∈ [t0, t]. Thus, according to (6), we have
‖(CDαw)(τ)‖ ≤ (1 + ‖w(τ)‖)c ≤ (1 +R1)c =M1 for a.e. τ ∈ [t0, t].
Finally, by the choice of H, we derive
‖w(τ) − w(τ ′)‖ ≤ HM1|τ − τ
′|α = H1|τ − τ
′|α, τ, τ ′ ∈ [t0, t].
The proposition is proved. 
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ and t
∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ]. By admissible control realizations
(controls) of the first and second players on the interval [t∗, t
∗), we mean
measurable functions u : [t∗, t
∗) → U and v : [t∗, t
∗) → V, respectively.
The sets of the admissible control realizations of the players are denoted
by U(t∗, t
∗) and V(t∗, t
∗). Following [17] (see also [11]), by a motion of sys-
tem (5) generated from the initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) by players’ control re-
alizations u(·) ∈ U(t∗, t
∗) and v(·) ∈ V(t∗, t
∗), we mean a function x(·) ∈
{w∗(t0)}+ I
α(L∞([t0, t
∗],Rn)) that satisfies the initial condition
x(t) = w∗(t), t ∈ [t0, t∗], (7)
and, together with u(·) and v(·), satisfies Eq. (5) for almost every t ∈ [t∗, t
∗].
For such a motion x(·) and a time t ∈ [t0, t
∗], we denote by (t, xt(·)) the
corresponding position of system (5), i.e.,
xt(τ) = x(τ), τ ∈ [t0, t]. (8)
Proposition 2 Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ and t
∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ]. Then any players’ con-
trol realizations u(·) ∈ U(t∗, t
∗) and v(·) ∈ V(t∗, t
∗) generate from the ini-
tial position (t∗, w∗(·)) a unique motion x(·) of system (5). Moreover, for any
t ∈ [t0, t
∗], the inclusion (t, xt(·)) ∈ G∗ is valid.
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Proof Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, t
∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ], u(·) ∈ U(t∗, t
∗), and v(·) ∈ V(t∗, t
∗).
The existence and uniqueness of the corresponding motion x(·) of system (5)
can be proved by the standard scheme (see, e.g., [8, Theorem 6.1], [46, The-
orem 3.1], and also [11, Theorem 2.1]), if we note that x(·) is the motion of
system (5) if and only if x(·) satisfies the inclusion x(·) ∈ C([t0, t
∗],Rn), initial
condition (7), and the integral equation
x(t) = w∗(t0) +
1
Γ (α)
∫ t∗
t0
(CDαw∗)(τ)
(t− τ)1−α
dτ
+
1
Γ (α)
∫ t
t∗
f(τ, x(τ), u(τ), v(τ))
(t− τ)1−α
dτ, t ∈ [t∗, t
∗].
Further, for t ∈ [t0, t∗], the inclusion (t, xt(·)) ∈ G∗ follows from initial con-
dition (7) and the inclusion (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗. For t ∈ (t∗, t
∗], the inclusion
(t, xt(·)) ∈ G∗ is valid due to (A.3). The proposition is proved. 
From Propositions 1 and 2 we derive the following result.
Corollary 1 Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ and t
∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ]. Let x(·) be the motion
of system (5) generated from the initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) by players’ control
realizations u(·) ∈ U(t∗, t
∗) and v(·) ∈ V(t∗, t
∗). Then the following inequalities
hold:
‖x(t)‖ ≤ R1, ‖x(t)− x(t
′)‖ ≤ H1|t− t
′|α, t, t′ ∈ [t0, t
∗],
where the constants R1 and H1 are taken from Proposition 1.
Let us note also the following property of motions of system (5), which
follows directly from Proposition 2. Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, t
∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ], and let
x(·) be the motion generated from (t∗, w∗(·)) by u(·) ∈ U(t∗, t
∗) and v(·) ∈
V(t∗, t
∗). Further, let t∗∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ], and let x∗(·) be the motion generated from
(t∗, xt∗(·)) by u
∗(·) ∈ U(t∗, t∗∗) and v∗(·) ∈ V(t∗, t∗∗). Then x∗(·) can be
considered as the motion generated from (t∗, w∗(·)) by the realizations
u∗∗(t) =
{
u(t), t ∈ [t∗, t
∗),
u∗(t), t ∈ [t∗, t∗∗),
v∗∗(t) =
{
v(t), t ∈ [t∗, t
∗),
v∗(t), t ∈ [t∗, t∗∗).
In particular, this property allows us to consider step-by-step feedback control
procedures for constructing players’ control realizations (see Sect. 6).
3.3 Quality Index
Let x(·) be the motion of system (5) generated from an initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈
G∗ by players’ control realizations u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ). Let qual-
ity of this motion be evaluated by the index
γ = σ(x(·)). (9)
We suppose that the function σ : C([t0, ϑ],R
n) → R satisfies the following
condition:
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(A.5) The function σ is continuous.
For dynamical system (5) and quality index (9), we consider a zero-sum
differential game in which the first player aims to minimize the value of the
quality index, and the second player aims to maximize it.
3.4 Non-anticipative Strategies and the Game Value
To define the value of the differential game (5), (9), we consider non-anticipative
strategies of the players (see, e.g., [3, Ch. VIII] and the references therein) and
introduce the lower and upper values of the game. Note that, in another ter-
minology, such strategies are called quasi-strategies (see, e.g., [44, p. 24]) or
progressive strategies (see, e.g., [9, § XI.4]).
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ be an initial position. By a non-anticipative strategy of
the first player, we mean a function α : V(t∗, ϑ)→ U(t∗, ϑ) with the following
property. For any t∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ] and any second player’s control realizations
v(·), v′(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ), if the equality v(t) = v
′(t) is valid for almost every
t ∈ [t∗, t
∗], then the corresponding images u(·) = α(v(·)) and u′(·) = α(v′(·))
satisfy the equality u(t) = u′(t) for almost every t ∈ [t∗, t
∗]. The lower value
of the differential game (5), (9) is defined by
ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) = inf
α
sup
v(·)∈V(t∗,ϑ)
γ, (10)
where γ is the value of quality index (9) that corresponds to the motion x(·)
generated from (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ by the second player’s control realization v(·)
and the first player’s control realization u(·) = α(v(·)).
Similarly, a function β : U(t∗, ϑ) → V(t∗, ϑ) is a non-anticipative strategy
of the second player if, for any t∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ] and any u(·), u
′(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) such
that u(t) = u′(t) for almost every t ∈ [t∗, t
∗], we have v(t) = v′(t) for almost
every t ∈ [t∗, t
∗], where v(·) = β(u(·)) and v′(·) = β(u′(·)). The upper value of
the game is defined by
ρ(v)(t∗, w∗(·)) = sup
β
inf
u(·)∈U(t∗,ϑ)
γ.
If the lower and upper game values coincide for any initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈
G∗, then we say that the game has the value
ρ(t∗, w∗(·)) = ρ
(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) = ρ
(v)(t∗, w∗(·)), (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗.
The goal of the paper is to prove that the differential game (5), (9) has
the value, and, for any initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, construct the players’
feedback control procedures that guarantee the game value ρ(t∗, w∗(·)) with a
given accuracy ζ > 0. These results are formulated in Theorem 1 (see Sect. 7).
The proof of this theorem follows the scheme from [30, Theorem 2] and is
based on the appropriate approximation of the differential game (5), (9). Before
describing this approximation, in the next section, we rewrite the considered
differential game in another form.
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4 Differential Game in a Neutral Type System
Let x(·) be the motion of system (5) generated from an initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈
G∗ by players’ control realizations u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ). Let us
consider the function
y(t) =
(
I1−α(x(·) − w∗(t0))
)
(t), t ∈ [t0, ϑ]. (11)
Since x(·) ∈ {w∗(t0)}+I
α(L∞([t0, ϑ],R
n)), then, according to the results given
in Sect. 2, we have
y(·) ∈ Lip0([t0, ϑ],R
n),
y˙(t) = (CDαx)(t) for a.e. t ∈ [t0, ϑ],
x(t) = w∗(t0) + (D
1−αy)(t), t ∈ [t0, ϑ].
(12)
Substituting these equalities into Eq. (5), we obtain that, instead of the orig-
inal differential game (5), (9), one can consider the differential game for the
dynamical system
y˙(t) = f
(
t, w∗(t0) + (D
1−αy)(t), u(t), v(t)
)
, t ∈ [t∗, ϑ], (13)
under the initial condition
y(t) =
(
I1−α(w∗(·)− w∗(t0))
)
(t), t ∈ [t0, t∗], (14)
and the quality index
γ = σ
(
w∗(t0) + (D
1−αy)(·)
)
. (15)
Furthermore, due to (3), one can rewrite Eq. (13) as follows:
y˙(t) = f
(
t, w∗(t0) +
1
Γ (α)
∫ t
t0
y˙(τ)
(t− τ)1−α
dτ, u(t), v(t)
)
, t ∈ [t∗, ϑ]. (16)
Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (16) depends explicitly on the history of
the derivative y˙(τ) for τ ∈ [t0, t]. Therefore, in the terminology of the theory of
functional differential equations (see, e.g., [5,16,21]), Eq. (16) is a functional
differential equation of a neutral type. To the best of our knowledge, in the
theory of differential games in neutral type systems (see the references in
Introduction), there are no results that can be directly applied for studying
the game (13), (15), and, therefore, the original game (5), (9) too. However,
as it is shown in the next section, the game (13), (15) can be approximated
by a differential game in a retarded type system.
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5 Approximating Differential Game
Following [12, Sect. 6], let us approximate in relations (13), (15) the fractional
derivative (D1−αy)(t) by the divided fractional difference hα−1(∆1−αh y)(t)
with a step size h > 0, where (see, e.g., [41, p. 385])
(∆1−αh y)(t) =
[(t−t0)/h]∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
1− α
i
)
y(t− ih), t ∈ [t0, ϑ], (17)
the symbol [τ ] means the integer part of τ ≥ 0, and
(
1−α
i
)
are the binomial
coefficients. In this section, we study the differential game obtained after this
approximation.
5.1 Approximating Dynamical System and Quality Index
Let us fix a vector w0 ∈ B(R0) and a sufficiently small value of the parameter
h > 0. Note that, in what follows, the vector w0 corresponds to an initial posi-
tion (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ of system (5) such that w0 = w∗(t0). Taking into account
the above, we consider the following zero-sum differential game, determined by
these two parameters w0 and h. We introduce the approximating dynamical
system which motion is described by the differential equation
y˙(t) = f
(
t, w0 + h
α−1(∆1−αh y)(t), p(t), q(t)
)
, t ∈ [t0, ϑ],
y(t) ∈ Rn, p(t) ∈ U, q(t) ∈ V,
(18)
and the approximating quality index
γw0,h = σ
(
w0 + h
α−1(∆1−αh y)(·)
)
. (19)
Here y(t) is the value of the state vector; p(t) and q(t) are respectively the
values of the control vectors of the first and second players. The first player
minimizes the value of quality index (19), the second player maximizes it.
Note that, according to (17), at a time t ∈ [t0, ϑ], the right-hand side of Eq.
(18) depends on the values y(t− ih) for i ∈ 0, [(t− t0)/h] and, in contrast to
(16), does not depend explicitly on the history of the derivative y˙(τ), τ ∈ [t0, t].
Thus, Eq. (18) is a functional differential equation of a retarded type. In what
follows, dealing with the game (18), (19), we mainly use the constructions and
results from [26,27,28].
Remark 1 Let us note that, even in a simple case when original quality index
(9) is terminal, i.e., γ = µ(x(ϑ)) for a function µ : Rn → R, the corresponding
approximating quality index γw0,h = µ(w0 + h
α−1(∆1−αh y)(ϑ)) is still non-
terminal, since, according to (17), it depends on the values y(ϑ − ih) for i ∈
0, [(ϑ− t0)/h].
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Taking into account (11) and (12), by a position of approximating system
(18), we mean a pair (t, r(·)) ∈ G such that r(t0) = 0. The set of such positions
is denoted by G0. This set is considered with the metric (see, e.g., [27] and
also [28, p. 25])
̺
(
(t, r(·)), (t′, r′(·))
)
= max
{
̺∗
(
(t, r(·)), (t′, r′(·))
)
, ̺∗
(
(t′, r′(·)), (t, r(·))
)}
,
where (t, r(·)), (t′, r′(·)) ∈ G0, and
̺∗
(
(t, r(·)), (t′, r′(·))
)
= max
τ∈[t0,t]
min
τ ′∈[t0,t′]
(
(τ − τ ′)2 + ‖r(τ) − r′(τ ′)‖2
)1/2
.
By the right-hand side of Eqs. (18), (19), let us define the functions
fw0,h(t, r(·), p, q) = f
(
t, w0 + h
α−1(∆1−αh r)(t), p, q
)
,
σw0,h(y(·)) = σ
(
w0 + h
α−1(∆1−αh y)(·)
)
,
where (t, r(·)) ∈ G0, p ∈ U, q ∈ V, and (ϑ, y(·)) ∈ G0.
Directly from properties (A.1)–(A.5) of the functions f and σ it follows
that these functions fw0,h and σw0,h satisfy the following conditions:
(B.1) For any h > 0, the functions fw0,h and σw0,h are continuous uniformly
in w0 ∈ B(R0).
(B.2) For any h > 0 and any R ≥ 0, there exists λh > 0 such that, for any
w0 ∈ B(R0), the inequality
‖fw0,h(t, r(·), p, q) − fw0,h(t, r
′(·), p, q)‖ ≤ λh max
τ∈[t0,t]
‖r(τ) − r′(τ)‖
is valid for any (t, r(·)), (t, r′(·)) ∈ G0 satisfying ‖r(·)‖∞ ≤ R, ‖r
′(·)‖∞ ≤ R
and any p ∈ U, q ∈ V.
(B.3) For any h > 0, there exists ch > 0 such that, for any w0 ∈ B(R0), the
estimate
‖fw0,h(t, r(·), p, q)‖ ≤ (1 + max
τ∈[t0,t]
‖r(τ)‖)ch
holds for any (t, r(·)) ∈ G0, p ∈ U, and q ∈ V.
(B.4) For any w0 ∈ B(R0) and any h > 0, the function fw0,h satisfies the
saddle point condition in a small game, i.e.,
min
p∈U
max
q∈V
〈s, fw0,h(t, r(·), p, q)〉 = max
q∈V
min
p∈U
〈s, fw0,h(t, r(·), p, q)〉
for any (t, r(·)) ∈ G0 and s ∈ Rn.
According to (14), if an initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ of original system
(5) is given, we define the corresponding initial position (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0 of
approximating system (18) as follows:
r∗(t) =
(
I1−α(w∗(·)− w∗(t0))
)
(t), t ∈ [t0, t∗]. (20)
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Due to Proposition 1 and the results given in Sect. 2, the function r∗(·) satisfies
the inclusion r∗(·) ∈ Lip
0
M1([t0, t∗],R
n). Taking this into account, we call a
position (t, r(·)) ∈ G0 of approximating system (18) admissible if
r(·) ∈ Lip0([t0, t],R
n),
‖r˙(τ)‖ ≤ (1 + max
ξ∈[t0,τ ]
‖r(ξ)‖)c˜h for a.e. τ ∈ [t0, t],
where c˜h = max{M1, ch}, and ch is the constant from condition (B.3). The set
of such admissible positions is denoted byG0h. Note that this set is independent
on the parameter w0.
Let (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h and t
∗ ∈ [t∗, ϑ]. As in Sect. 3.2, by admissible con-
trol realizations of the players in the approximating game (18), (19), we
mean functions p(·) ∈ U(t∗, t
∗) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, t
∗). Due to properties (B.1)–
(B.3), from the initial position (t∗, r∗(·)), such control realizations p(·) and
q(·) uniquely generate the motion of approximating system (18) that is the
function y(·) ∈ Lip0([t0, t
∗],Rn) satisfying the initial condition y(t) = r∗(t),
t ∈ [t0, t∗], and, together with p(·) and q(·), satisfying Eq. (18) for almost every
t ∈ [t∗, t
∗].
Let us note the following properties of the setG0h. Firstly, for any (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈
G∗, the inclusion (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h is valid for the function r∗(·) defined by
(20). Secondly, for the motion y(·) of approximating system (18) generated
from (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h by p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ), the inclusion
(t, yt(·)) ∈ G
0
h holds for any t ∈ [t∗, ϑ], where, according to (8), we denote
yt(τ) = y(τ), τ ∈ [t0, t]. Finally, the set G
0
h is a compact subset of G
0.
Following the the scheme from [12, Lemma 2] and taking into account
that the constant R1 in Proposition 1 does not depend on an initial position
(t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, one can prove the result below.
Proposition 3 There exists L1 > 0 such that the following statement holds.
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ be an initial position of original system (5). Let us consider
approximating system (18) for w0 = w∗(t0), any h > 0, and under the initial
position (t∗, r∗(·)) defined by (20). Then the inclusion y(·) ∈ Lip
0
L1([t0, ϑ],R
n)
is valid for any motion y(·) of the approximating system generated from (t∗, r∗(·))
by p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ).
5.2 The Value of the Approximating Game
Let w0 ∈ B(R0) and h > 0 be fixed. Similarly to Sect. 3.4, in the approximating
differential game (18), (19), one can consider non-anticipative strategies of the
players and introduce the lower and upper game values, denoted respectively
by ρ
(p)
w0,h
(t∗, r∗(·)) and ρ
(q)
w0,h
(t∗, r∗(·)), (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h. From the results of
[26,27,28] (see also [15]) it follows that, under conditions (B.1)–(B.4), the
approximating game has the value
ρw0,h(t∗, r∗(·)) = ρ
(p)
w0,h
(t∗, r∗(·)) = ρ
(q)
w0,h
(t∗, r∗(·)), (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h,
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and, furthermore, this value can be guaranteed by the players if they use the
positional strategies, described in the next section.
5.3 Optimal Positional Strategies
Let w0 ∈ B(R0) and h > 0 be fixed. In the approximating differential game
(5), (9), by the positional strategies Pw0,h and Qw0,h of the players, we mean
arbitrary functions
G0h × (0,∞) ∋ (t, r(·), ε) 7→ Pw0,h(t, r(·), ε) ∈ U,
G0h × (0,∞) ∋ (t, r(·), ε) 7→ Qw0,h(t, r(·), ε) ∈ V,
where ε is the accuracy parameter.
Let (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h, ε > 0, and let
∆ = {τj}
k+1
j=1 , τ1 = t∗, τj+1 > τj , j ∈ 1, k, τk+1 = ϑ, k ∈ N, (21)
be a partition of the interval [t∗, ϑ]. The triple {Pw0,h, ε,∆} is called a control
law of the first player. This law forms in the approximating system a piece-
wise constant control realization p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) by the following step-by-step
feedback rule:
p(t) = Pw0,h(τj , yτj (·), ε), t ∈ [τj , τj+1), j ∈ 1, k, (22)
where yτ1(·) = r∗(·). Thus, from the initial position (t∗, r∗(·)), the control law
of the first player {Pw0,h, ε,∆} together with a control realization of the second
player q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) uniquely generate the motion y(·) of the approximating
system and, therefore, determine the value γw0,h of approximating quality
index (19).
Similarly, we consider the control law of the second player {Qw0,h, ε,∆},
which forms a piecewise constant control realization q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) as follows:
q(t) = Qw0,h(τj , yτj(·), ε), t ∈ [τj , τj+1), j ∈ 1, k. (23)
From the initial position (t∗, r∗(·)), the control law {Qw0,h, ε,∆} together with
p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) uniquely generate the motion y(·) of the approximating system
and determine the value γw0,h of approximating quality index (19).
By the scheme from [26, Theorem 1] (see also [28, Theorem 17.1]), one can
prove the following lemma (see [15] for a related technique).
Lemma 1 For any w0 ∈ B(R0) and any h > 0, in the approximating differen-
tial game (18), (19), there exist the players’ optimal positional strategies P 0w0,h
and Q0w0,h that are optimal uniformly in (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h and w0 ∈ B(R0).
Namely, for any h > 0 and any ζ > 0, one can choose ε(1) = ε(1)(h, ζ) > 0
and δ(1)(ε) = δ(1)(ε, h, ζ) > 0, ε ∈ (0, ε(1)], such that the following statement
holds. Let w0 ∈ B(R0), (t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ G
0
h, ε ∈ (0, ε
(1)], and let ∆ be a partition
(21) with the diameter diam(∆) = maxj∈1,k(τj+1 − τj) ≤ δ
(1)(ε). Then the
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control law {P 0w0,h, ε,∆} of the first player guarantees for the value γw0,h of
approximating quality index (19) the inequality
γw0,h ≤ ρw0,h(t∗, r∗(·)) + ζ
for any control realization of the second player q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ); and the con-
trol law {Q0w0,h, ε,∆} of the second player guarantees for the value γw0,h of
approximating quality index (19) the inequality
γw0,h ≥ ρw0,h(t∗, r∗(·))− ζ
for any control realization of the first player p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ).
Note that the uniformness in the parameter w0 ∈ B(R0) is provided by
the corresponding uniformness in properties (B.1)–(B.3).
Let us describe shortly one of the ways of constructing such optimal strate-
gies P 0w0,h and Q
0
w0,h
.We apply the method of extremal shift to accompanying
points (see, e.g., [22,23] and also [26,28]). For simplicity of the notation below,
it is convenient to consider the so-called pre-strategies of the players in the
approximating game (18), (19). Namely, by pre-strategies pw0,h and qw0,h of
the first and second players, we mean functions
G0h × R
n ∋ (t, r(·), s) 7→ pw0,h(t, r(·), s) ∈ U,
G0h × R
n ∋ (t, r(·), s) 7→ qw0,h(t, r(·), s) ∈ V
that, for any (t, r(·)) ∈ G0h and any s ∈ R
n, satisfy the inclusions
pw0,h(t, r(·), s) ∈ argmin
p∈U
max
q∈V
〈s, fw0,h(t, r(·), p, q)〉,
qw0,h(t, r(·), s) ∈ argmax
q∈V
min
p∈U
〈s, fw0,h(t, r(·), p, q
)
〉.
Let (t, r(·)) ∈ G0h and ε > 0. For the first and second players, we choose the
accompanying points r
(p)
ε (·) and r
(q)
ε (·) from the conditions
r(p)ε (·) ∈ argmin ρw0,h(t, rε(·)), r
(q)
ε (·) ∈ argmaxρw0,h(t, rε(·)),
where the minimum and maximum are calculated over the functions rε(·) such
that
(t, rε(·)) ∈ G
0
h, max
τ∈[t0,t]
‖r(τ) − rε(τ)‖ ≤ (t− t0)e
(t−t0)λhε,
and the constant λh is chosen by the set G
0
h in accordance with property (B.2).
Note that the minimum and maximum are attained due to continuity of the
value function G0h ∋ (t∗, r∗(·)) 7→ ρw0,h(t∗, r∗(·)) ∈ R. After that, we define
P 0w0,h(t, r(·), ε) = pw0,h(t, r(·), r(t) − r
(p)
ε (t)),
Q0w0,h(t, r(·), ε) = qw0,h(t, r(·), r
(q)
ε (t)− r(t)).
Zero-sum differential game with fractional dynamics 15
Remark 2 There are another methods for constructing the optimal positional
strategies P 0w0,h and Q
0
w0,h
(see, e.g., [25,26,27,28]). For example, if the value
function ρw0,h is coinvariantly smooth, then the method of extremal shift in
the direction of the coinvariant gradient of ρw0,h can be applied. In the general
non-smooth case, such strategies can be constructed by the extremal shift in
direction of the coinvariant gradient of a suitable coinvariantly smooth auxil-
iary function. Also, one can use the methods based on the notions of maximal
u- and v-stable bridges. Furthermore, there are some specific methods for con-
structing the optimal strategies in the linear case (see, e.g., [13,32]).
6 Players’ Control Procedures with a Guide
In this section, we propose the players’ feedback control procedures that use
the optimally controlled approximating system (18) as a guide. It allows us to
show that the values of the approximating differential games (18), (19) have
the limit when h ↓ 0. This fact constitutes the basis of the proof of the main
result of the paper formulated in Theorem 1 (see Sect. 7).
6.1 Mutual Aiming Procedures between the Systems
According to [12, Sect. 7], let us consider the following mutual aiming pro-
cedure between original (5) and approximating (18) systems. First of all, let
us introduce pre-strategies of the players in the original game (5), (9). By
pre-strategies u and v of the first and second players, we mean functions
[t0, ϑ]× R
n × Rn ∋ (t, x, s) 7→ u(t, x, s) ∈ U,
[t0, ϑ]× R
n × Rn ∋ (t, x, s) 7→ v(t, x, s) ∈ V
that, for any t ∈ [t0, ϑ] and any x, s ∈ R
n, satisfy the inclusions
u(t, x, s) ∈ argmin
u∈U
max
v∈V
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉,
v(t, x, s) ∈ argmax
v∈V
min
u∈U
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉.
Further, for (t, w(·)) ∈ G∗ and (t, r(·)) ∈ G
0
h, let us denote
s(t, w(·), r(·)) = w(t) − w(t0)− h
α−1(∆1−αh r)(t).
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ be an initial position of original system (5). Let us
fix h > 0, put w0 = w∗(t0), and consider the corresponding approximating
system (18) under the initial position (t∗, r∗(·)) defined by (20). Let us fix also
a partition ∆ (21). Let a first player’s control realization u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) in the
original system and a second player’s control realization q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) in the
approximating system be formed simultaneously according to the following
step-by-step feedback rule:
u(t) = u(τj , x(τj), sj), q(t) = qw0,h(τj , yτj(·), sj), t ∈ [τj , τj+1), (24)
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where
sj = s(τj , xτj (·), yτj (·)), (25)
and qw0,h is a pre-strategy of the second player in the approximating game.
Lemma 2 For any ξ > 0, there exist h(2) = h(2)(ξ) > 0 and δ(2) = δ(2)(ξ) > 0
such that, for any initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ of original system (5) and
any partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ(2), the following state-
ment is valid. Let us consider approximating system (18) for w0 = w∗(t0) and
h ∈ (0, h(2)] under the initial position (t∗, r∗(·)) defined by (20). Then, for any
control realizations v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) and p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ), if control realizations
u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) are formed according to the mutual aim-
ing procedure (24), (25), then the corresponding motions x(·) and y(·) of the
original and approximating systems satisfy the inequality
‖x(t)− w0 − h
α−1(∆1−αh y)(t)‖ ≤ ξ, t ∈ [t0, ϑ]. (26)
The lemma is proved by the scheme from [12, Theorem 3], if we take into
account that the constants R1 and H1 in Corollary 1 and the constant L1 in
Proposition 3 do not depend on an initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗.
Similarly, one can consider another mutual aiming procedure between the
original and approximating systems. Namely, let v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) and p(·) ∈
U(t∗, ϑ) be formed on the basis of the partition ∆ as follows:
v(t) = v(τj , x(τj), sj), p(t) = pw0,h(τj , yτj (·), sj), t ∈ [τj , τj+1), (27)
where
sj = −s(τj , xτj (·), yτj (·)). (28)
By analogy with Lemma 2, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 For any ξ > 0, there exist h(3) = h(3)(ξ) > 0 and δ(3) = δ(3)(ξ) > 0
such that, for any initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗ of original system (5) and
any partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ(3), the following state-
ment is valid. Let us consider approximating system (18) for w0 = w∗(t0) and
h ∈ (0, h(3)] under the initial position (t∗, r∗(·)) defined by (20). Then, for any
realizations u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ), if realizations v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ)
and p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) are formed according to the mutual aiming procedure (27),
(28), then the corresponding motions x(·) and y(·) of the original and approx-
imating systems satisfy inequality (26).
6.2 First Player’s Control Procedure with a Guide
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, h > 0, ε > 0, and a partition ∆ (21) be fixed. We propose
the following control procedure of the first player in the original differential
game (5), (9). Let us consider the approximating differential game (18), (19)
for w0 = w∗(t0), the fixed h, and with the initial position (t∗, r∗(·)) defined
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by (20). By the steps of the partition ∆, the first player forms a control re-
alization u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) in the original system and, at the same time, control
realizations p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) in the approximating system
as follows: u(·) and q(·) are formed according to the mutual aiming proce-
dure (24), (25), and p(·) is formed by the control law {P 0w0,h, ε,∆} (see (22))
on the basis of the optimal strategy P 0w0,h taken from Lemma 1. Note that,
from the initial position (t∗, w∗(·)), the described control procedure together
with v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) uniquely generate the motion x(·) of the original system
and, therefore, determine the value γ of quality index (9). Moreover, during
this control procedure, the first player generates the auxiliary motion y(·) of
the approximating system, which can be considered as a guide (see, e.g., [25,
§ 8.2]). For convenience, in what follows, the described control procedure is
referred as U(t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆).
For any h > 0, let us introduce the function
ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·)) = ρw0,h(t∗, r∗(·)), (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, (29)
where r∗(·) is defined according to (20), and ρw0,h(t∗, r∗(·)) is the value of the
approximating differential game (18), (19) for w0 = w∗(t0) and the fixed h.
Lemma 4 For any ζ > 0, there exist
h(4) = h(4)(ζ) > 0,
ε(4)(h) = ε(4)(h, ζ) > 0, h ∈ (0, h(4)],
δ(4)(ε, h) = δ(4)(ε, h, ζ) > 0, ε ∈ (0, ε(4)(h)], h ∈ (0, h(4)],
such that, for any (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, h ∈ (0, h
(4)], ε ∈ (0, ε(4)(h)], and any
partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ(4)(ε, h), the first player’s
control procedure with a guide U(t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆) guarantees for the value γ
of quality index (9) the inequality
γ ≤ ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ
for any control realization of the second player v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ).
Proof Applying [12, Proposition 7], by the constant L1 from Proposition 3,
one can choose R2 > 0 and H2 > 0 such that the inequalities
‖hα−1(∆1−αh y)(t)‖ ≤ R2,
‖hα−1(∆1−αh y)(t)− h
α−1(∆1−αh y)(t
′)‖ ≤ H2|t− t
′|α, t, t′ ∈ [t0, ϑ],
are valid for any h > 0 and any y(·) ∈ Lip0L1([t0, ϑ],R
n). Taking the con-
stants R1 and H1 from Corollary 1, we define R3 = max{R1, R0 + R2},
H3 = max{H1, H2}, and consider the compact set D ⊂ C([t0, ϑ],R
n) con-
sisting of the functions x(·) such that
‖x(t)‖ ≤ R3, ‖x(t)− x(t
′)‖ ≤ H3|t− t
′|α, t, t′ ∈ [t0, ϑ].
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Let ζ > 0 be fixed. Due to (A.5), there exists ξ = ξ(ζ) > 0 such that, for any
x(·), x′(·) ∈ D, from the inequality ‖x(·)−x′(·)‖∞ ≤ ξ it follows that |σ(x(·))−
σ(x′(·))| ≤ ζ/2. Let us choose h(2)(ξ) > 0 and δ(2)(ξ) > 0 by Lemma 2, and
put h(4) = h(2)(ξ). Finally, for any h ∈ (0, h(4)], we take ε(1)(h, ζ/2) > 0 and
δ(1)(ε, h, ζ/2) > 0, ε ∈ (0, ε(1)(h, ζ/2)], from Lemma 1, and define
ε(4)(h) = ε(1)(h, ζ/2),
δ(4)(ε, h) = min
{
δ(1)(ε, h, ζ/2), δ(2)(ξ)
}
, ε ∈ (0, ε(4)(h)].
Let us show that the statement of the lemma is valid for the chosen parameters.
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, h ∈ (0, h
(4)], ε ∈ (0, ε(4)(h)], and let ∆ be a parti-
tion (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ(4)(ε, h). Let us consider the motion
x(·) of system (5) generated from the initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) by the first
player’s control procedure with a guide U = U(t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆) and a second
player’s control realization v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ). Let us consider the correspond-
ing first player’s control realization u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) in the original system and
players’ control realizations p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) in the approxi-
mating system (18) for w0 = w∗(t0), the fixed h, and with the initial position
(t∗, r∗(·)) defined by (20). Let y(·) be the corresponding motion of the approx-
imating system. By the definition of U, the motion y(·) is generated by the
control law {P 0w0,h, ε,∆} on the basis of the first player’s optimal positional
strategy P 0w0,h. Hence, for the auxiliary function x
′(t) = w0+h
α−1(∆1−αh y)(t),
t ∈ [t0, ϑ], due to the choice of ε and ∆, we obtain
σ(x′(·)) = σw0,h(y(·)) = γw0,h ≤ ρw0,h(t∗, r∗(·)) + ζ/2 = ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ/2.
Moreover, the control realizations u(·) and q(·) are formed according to the
mutual aiming procedure (24), (25). Therefore, according to the choice of h
and ∆, we derive ‖x(·)−x′(·)‖∞ ≤ ξ. Thus, taking into account the inclusions
x(·), x′(·) ∈ D, by the choice of ξ, we have
γ = σ(x(·)) ≤ σ(x′(·)) + ζ/2 ≤ ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ.
The lemma is proved. 
6.3 Second Player’s Control Procedure with a Guide
Similarly to Sect. 6.2, we propose the following second player’s control proce-
dure with a guide in the original differential game (5), (9). Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗,
h > 0, ε > 0, and a partition ∆ (21) be fixed. Let us consider the approxi-
mating differential game (18), (19) for w0 = w∗(t0), the fixed h, and with the
initial position (t∗, r∗(·)) defined by (20). By the steps of the partition ∆, the
second player forms a control realization v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) in the original system
and, at the same time, control realizations p(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and q(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ)
in the approximating system as follows: v(·) and p(·) are formed according to
the mutual aiming procedure (27), (28), and q(·) is formed by the control law
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{Q0w0,h, ε,∆} (see (23)) on the basis of the optimal strategy Q
0
w0,h
taken from
Lemma 1. From the initial position (t∗, w∗(·)), the described control procedure
together with u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) uniquely generate the motion x(·) of the original
system and determine the value γ of quality index (9). In what follows, this
control procedure with a guide is referred as V (t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆).
By analogy with Lemma 4, on the basis of Lemma 3, the following result
can be proved.
Lemma 5 For any ζ > 0, there exist
h(5) = h(5)(ζ) > 0,
ε(5)(h) = ε(5)(h, ζ) > 0, h ∈ (0, h(5)],
δ(5)(ε, h) = δ(5)(ε, h, ζ) > 0, ε ∈ (0, ε(5)(h)], h ∈ (0, h(5)],
such that, for any (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, h ∈ (0, h
(5)], ε ∈ (0, ε(5)(h)], and any
partition ∆ (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ(5)(ε, h), the second player’s
control procedure with a guide V (t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆) guarantees for the value γ
of quality index (9) the inequality
γ ≥ ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·))− ζ
for any control realization of the first player u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ).
6.4 Limit of the Values of the Approximating Games
Considering in the original differential game (5), (9) the case when the both
players use the described in Sect. 6.2 and 6.3 control procedures with a guide,
we obtain the result below.
Lemma 6 For any initial position (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, the following limit exists:
lim
h↓0
ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·)) = ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)), (30)
where ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·)) is defined by (29). Moreover, the convergence is uniform in
(t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗.
Proof By the Cauchy criterion, to prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show
that, for any ζ > 0, there exists h = h(ζ) > 0 such that, for any h1, h2 ∈ (0, h]
and any (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, the inequality below is valid:
ρ̂h2(t∗, w∗(·)) ≤ ρ̂h1(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ. (31)
Let ζ > 0 be fixed. By Lemmas 4 and 5, for i ∈ {4, 5}, let us choose
h(i) = h(i)(ζ/2) > 0,
ε(i)(h) = ε(i)(h, ζ/2) > 0, h ∈ (0, h(i)],
δ(i)(ε, h) = δ(i)(ε, h, ζ/2) > 0, ε ∈ (0, ε(i)(h)], h ∈ (0, h(i)],
(32)
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and put h = min{h(4), h(5)}. Let h1, h2 ∈ (0, h]. We define
ε = min
{
ε(4)(h1), ε
(5)(h2)
}
, δ = min
{
δ(4)(ε, h1), δ
(5)(ε, h2)
}
.
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, and ∆ be a partition (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ.
Let us consider the motion x(·) of system (5) generated by the players’ control
procedures with a guide U(t∗, w∗(·), h1, ε,∆) and V (t∗, w∗(·), h2, ε,∆). Then,
for the realized value γ = σ(x(·)) of quality index (9), due to the choice of h1,
h2, ε and ∆, we have
ρ̂h2(t∗, w∗(·)) − ζ/2 ≤ γ ≤ ρ̂h1(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ/2,
wherefrom we derive (31). The lemma is proved. 
7 Value of the Game
The main result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 1 Let conditions (A.1)–(A.5) be satisfied. Then:
1. The differential game (5), (7) has the value ρ(t∗, w∗(·)), (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗.
2. This value coincides with the limit ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) (see (30)) of the values of
the approximating differential games (18), (19).
3. For any ζ > 0, there exist
h∗ = h∗(ζ) > 0,
ε∗(h) = ε∗(h, ζ) > 0, h ∈ (0, h∗],
δ∗(ε, h) = δ∗(ε, h, ζ) > 0, ε ∈ (0, ε∗(h)], h ∈ (0, h∗],
such that the following statement holds. Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, h ∈ (0, h∗],
ε ∈ (0, ε∗(h)], and let ∆ be a partition (21) with the diameter diam(∆) ≤
δ∗(ε, h). Then the control procedure with a guide of the first player U(t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆)
guarantees for the value γ of quality index (9) the inequality
γ ≤ ρ(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ (33)
for any control realization of the second player u(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ); and the con-
trol procedure with a guide of the second player V (t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆) guar-
antees for the value γ of quality index (9) the inequality
γ ≥ ρ(t∗, w∗(·)) − ζ (34)
for any control realization of the first player u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ).
Proof Let ζ > 0 be fixed. Let us define
h∗ = min
{
h(4), h(5), h(6)
}
,
ε∗(h) = min
{
ε(4)(h), ε(5)(h)
}
, h ∈ (0, h∗],
δ∗(ε, h) = min
{
δ(4)(ε, h), δ(5)(ε, h)
}
, ε ∈ (0, ε∗], h ∈ (0, h∗],
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where h(i) > 0, ε(i)(h) > 0 and δ(i)(ε, h) > 0 for i ∈ {4, 5} are chosen as in
(32), and h(6) = h(6)(ζ/2) > 0 is chosen according to Lemma 6 such that, for
any h ∈ (0, h(6)] and any (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, the inequality below is valid:
|ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) − ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·))| ≤ ζ/2.
Let (t∗, w∗(·)) ∈ G∗, h ∈ (0, h∗], ε ∈ (0, ε∗(h)], and let ∆ be a partition (21)
with the diameter diam(∆) ≤ δ∗(ε, h). Let us consider the first player’s control
procedure with a guide U = U(t∗, w∗(·), h, ε,∆). On the basis of this proce-
dure, we define the first player’s non-anticipative strategy α (see Sect. 3.4)
as follows. For any v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ), we consider the unique motion x(·) of
system (5) and the control realization u(·) that are formed by U and v(·),
and put α(v(·)) = u(·). Further, since, by the choice of h, ε and ∆, for any
v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ), the corresponding value γ = σ(x(·)) of quality index (9) satis-
fies the inequality
γ ≤ ρ̂h(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ/2 ≤ ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ, (35)
then, by definition (10) of the lower game value ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)), we obtain
ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) ≤ ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ.
Taking into account that this inequality is valid for any ζ > 0, we derive
ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) ≤ ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)).
Now, arguing by contradiction, let us suppose that
ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ
∗ = ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) (36)
for a number ζ∗ > 0. Let α∗ be a first player’s non-anticipative strategy such
that, for any v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ), the motion x(·) of system (5) generated from
(t∗, w∗(·)) by v(·) and u(·) = α
∗(v(·)) satisfies the inequality
γ = σ(x(·)) ≤ ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ
∗/3.
Similarly to above, based on Lemmas 5 and 6, by the number ζ∗/3, one can
choose h∗ > 0, ε∗ > 0, and a partition ∆∗ (21) such that the motion x(·) of
system (5) generated from (t∗, w∗(·)) by the second player’s control procedure
with a guide V = V (t∗, w∗(·), h
∗, ε∗, ∆∗) and a first player’s control realization
u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) satisfies the inequality
γ = σ(x(·)) ≥ ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) − ζ
∗/3.
According to the definition (see Sect 6.3), the control procedure V forms v(·)
by the steps of the partition ∆∗ on the basis of the information about the
realized values of the state vectors of the original and approximating systems.
Therefore, since α∗ is non-anticipative, one can consider the motion x∗(·) gen-
erated by u(·) ∈ U(t∗, ϑ) and v(·) ∈ V(t∗, ϑ) such that u(·) = α
∗(v(·)), and, at
the same time, v(·) is formed by V. For this motion x∗(·), we have
ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·))− ζ
∗/3 ≤ σ(x∗(·)) ≤ ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) + ζ
∗/3,
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wherefrom we obtain
ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) ≤ ρ
(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) + 2ζ
∗/3.
The obtained inequality contradicts (36) since ζ∗ > 0. Hence, we derive
ρ(u)(t∗, w∗(·)) = ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)). (37)
The validity of the equality ρ(v)(t∗, w∗(·)) = ρ̂ (t∗, w∗(·)) can be established
in a similar way. Thus, the first and second parts of the theorem are proved.
Inequality (33) in the third part of the theorem follows directly from (35) and
(37). The validity of inequality (34) can be shown similarly. The theorem is
proved. 
Remark 3 Let us note that, following [25, § 8.2] (see also [30] for details), one
can consider another formalization of the differential game (5), (9). Namely,
one can formally describe a sufficiently wide classes of players’ strategies with
a guide and introduce the corresponding values of the players’ optimal guaran-
teed results. One can show that from Theorem 1 it follows that these optimal
guaranteed results coincide, i.e., the differential game has the value in the
classes of strategies with a guide, and this value is equal to ρ(t∗, w∗(·)). More-
over, the players’ strategies with a guide that guarantee inequalities (33) and
(34) can be constructed on the basis of the proposed in Sects. 6.2 and 6.3
control procedures. In this sense, these control procedures with a guide can be
called optimal.
Remark 4 In addition to Remark 2, another possible way of solving the ap-
proximating differential game (18), (19) is to approximate functional differen-
tial equation of a retarded type (18) by a high-dimensional system of ordinary
differential equations (see, e.g., [31] and the references therein). Note that this
approach can also be used for proving the existence of the game value and con-
structing the players’ optimal control procedures with a guide in the original
differential game (5), (9).
8 Conclusion
In the paper, we have considered a zero-sum differential game in a dynamical
system which motion is described by a fractional differential equation. We have
proved that the lower and upper game values coincide, i.e., the differential
game has the value. The proof is based on the appropriate approximation
of the game by a differential game in a dynamical system which motion is
described by a first order functional differential equation of a retarded type.
This approach has also allowed us to propose the optimal players’ feedback
control procedures with a guide, which can be effectively applied if the optimal
in the approximating game players’ positional strategies are found.
Zero-sum differential game with fractional dynamics 23
References
1. Bannikov AS (2017) Evasion from pursuers in a problem of group pursuit with frac-
tional derivatives and phase constraints. Vestn Udmurtsk Univ Mat Mekh Komp Nauki
27(3):309–314 (in Russian)
2. Baranovskaya LV (2015) A method of resolving functions for one class of pursuit prob-
lems. East-Eur J Enterp Technol 74(4):4–8 (in Russian)
3. Bardi M, Capuzzo-Dolcetta I (1997) Optimal control and viscosity solutions of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. Birkha¨user, Basel
4. Bas¸ar T, Olsder GJ (1999) Dynamic noncooperative game theory. Second edition, Clas-
sics in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, Philadelphia
5. Bellman R, Cooke KL (1963) Differential-difference equations. Academic Press, London
6. Cardaliaguet P, Quincampoix M, Saint-Pierre P (2007) Differential games through vi-
ability theory: old and recent results. In: Advances in dynamic game theory: numerical
methods, algorithms, and applications to ecology and economics, Birkha¨user, Boston,
pp. 3–35
7. Chikrii A, Matychyn I (2011) Riemann–Liouville, Caputo, and sequential fractional
derivatives in differential games. In: Advances in dynamic games: theory, applications,
and numerical methods for differential and stochastic games, Birkha¨user, Boston, pp.
61–81
8. Diethelm K (2010) The analysis of fractional differential equations. Springer, Berlin
9. Fleming WH, Soner HM (2006) Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions.
Second edition, Springer-Verlag, New York
10. Friedman A (1971) Differential games. Wiley, New York
11. Gomoyunov MI (2017) Fractional derivatives of convex Lyapunov functions and control
problems in fractional order systems. arXiv:1710.07003 (submitted to Frac Calc Appl
Anal)
12. Gomoyunov MI (2018) Approximation of fractional order conflict-controlled systems.
arXiv:1805.10838 (submitted to Progr Fract Differ Appl)
13. Gomoyunov MI, Lukoyanov NYu (2012) Guarantee optimization in functional-
differential systems with a control aftereffect. J Appl Math Mech 76(4):369–377
14. Gomoyunov MI, Lukoyanov NYu (2018) On the numerical solution of differential games
for neutral-type linear systems. Proc Steklov Inst Math 301(suppl 1):44–56
15. Gomoyunov MI, Lukoyanov NYu, Plaksin AR (2017) Existence of a value and a saddle
point in positional differential games for neutral-type systems. Proc Steklov Inst Math
299(suppl 1):37–48
16. Hale JK, Lunel SMV (1993) Introduction to functional differential equations. Springer,
New York
17. Idczak D, Kamocki R (2011) On the existence and uniqueness and formula for the
solution of R-L fractional Cauchy problem in Rn. Fract Calc Appl Anal 14(4):538–553
18. Isaacs R (1965) Differential games. Wiley, New York
19. Jajarmi A, Hajipour M, Mohammadzadeh E, Baleanu D (2018) A new approach for
the nonlinear fractional optimal control problems with external persistent disturbances.
Journal of the Franklin Institute 355:3938–3967
20. Kilbas AA, Srivastava HM, Trujillo JJ (2006) Theory and applications of fractional
differential equations. Elsevier
21. Kolmanovskii V, Myshkis A (1992) Applied theory of functional differential equations.
Kluwer, Dordrecht
22. Krasovskii AN, Krasovskii NN (1995) Control under lack of information. Birkha¨user,
Berlin
23. Krasovskii NN (1985) Control of a dynamical system: problem on the minimum of
guaranteed result. Nauka, Moscow (in Russian)
24. Krasovskii NN, Kotelnikova AN (2012) Stochastic guide for a time-delay object in a
positional differential game. Proc Steklov Inst Math 277(suppl 1):145–151
25. Krasovskii NN, Subbotin AI (1988) Game-theoretical control problems. Springer, New
York
26. Lukoyanov NYu (2000) A Hamilton-Jacobi type equation in control problems with
hereditary information. J Appl Math Mech 64(2):243–253
24 Mikhail Gomoyunov
27. Lukoyanov NYu (2003) Functional Hamilton-Jacobi type equations with ci-derivatives
in control problems with hereditary information. Nonlinear Funct Anal Appl 8(4), 535–
555
28. Lukoyanov NYu (2011) Functional Hamilton-Jacobi equations and control problems
with hereditary information. Ural Federal University Publ, Ekaterinburg (in Russian)
29. Lukoyanov NYu, Gomoyunov MI, Plaksin AR (2017) Hamilton-Jacobi functional equa-
tions and differential games for neutral-type systems. Dokl Math (96)(3):654–657
30. Lukoyanov NYu, Plaksin AR (2015) Differential games for neutral-type systems: an
approximation model. Proc Steklov Inst Math 291(1):190–202
31. Lukoyanov NYu, Plaksin AR (2015) On approximations of time-delay control systems.
IFAC-PapersOnLine 28(25):178–182
32. Lukoyanov NYu, Reshetova TN (1998) Problems of conflict control of high dimension-
ality functional systems. J Appl Math Mech 62(4):545–554
33. Maksimov VI (1991) A differential game of guidance for systems with a deviating
argument of neutral type. In: Problems of dynamic control (IMM UNTs AN SSSR,
Sverdlovsk), pp. 33–45 (in Russian)
34. Mamatov M, Alimov K (2018) Differential games of persecution of frozen order with
separate dynamics. Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics 6:475–487
35. Miller KS, Ross B (1993) An introduction to the fractional calculus and fractional
differential equations. Wiley, New York
36. Nikol’skii MS (1972) Linear differential pursuit games in the presence of lags. Differ
Uravn 8(2):260–267 (in Russian)
37. Osipov YuS (1971) Differential games of systems with aftereffect. Dokl Akad Nauk SSSR
196(4):779–782
38. Petrov NN (2018) A multiple capture in a group pursuit problem with fractional deriva-
tives. Trudy Inst Mat Mekh UrO RAN 24(1):156–164 (in Russian)
39. Podlubny I (1999) Fractional differential equations. Academic Press, New York
40. Pontryagin LS (1981) Linear differential games of pursuit. Math USSR-Sbornik
40(3):285–303
41. Samko SG, Kilbas AA, Marichev OI (1993) Fractional integrals and derivatives. Theory
and applications. Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers
42. Shen J, Lam J (2014) State feedback H∞ control of commensurate fractional-order
systems. International Journal of Systems Science 45(3):363–372
43. Subbotin AI (1995) Generalized solutions of first-order PDEs: the dynamical optimiza-
tion perspective. Birkha¨user, Boston
44. Subbotin AI, Chentsov AG (1981) Guarantee optimization in control problems. Nauka,
Moscow (in Russian)
45. Vasil’ev FP (1972) Concerning conditions of existence of a saddle point in determinate
games for integro-differential systems with a neutral type delay. Avtomat i Telemekh
2:40–50 (in Russian)
46. Wang J, Zhou Y (2011) A class of fractional evolution equations and optimal controls.
Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Appl 12(1):262–272
